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How to set up DMARC/DKIM/SPF for SYNAQ

Published 21 Nov 2026
Updated 21 Nov 2026
12 min read
Summarize with
SYNAQ email authentication setup with SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
To set up DMARC/DKIM/SPF for SYNAQ, have SYNAQ provision your sending domain, authorize its outbound servers in your existing SPF record, confirm DKIM signing on delivered messages, and publish DMARC at _dmarc.yourdomain. Start new DMARC deployments with p=none, then enforce a stronger policy after checking legitimate traffic.
I verify the Return-Path and DKIM signing domain before changing policy. SYNAQ supports Return-Path alignment, so SPF can satisfy DMARC for your domain. A passing signature under d=synaq.com does not provide DKIM alignment for an unrelated From domain. At least one passing method must authenticate a domain that matches your From domain under the applicable DMARC alignment mode.

Add your domain

Start with the SYNAQ account or reseller that manages your SecureMail service. I request domain provisioning and the outbound authentication details together, rather than assuming that an inbound filtering subscription includes outbound relay.
SYNAQ publishes a customer portal login and documents both SMTP credentials and public-IP authorization for outbound mail. The exact domain setup is account-specific; use its onboarding instructions or support process instead of looking for an undocumented self-service button.
  1. Request provisioning. Give SYNAQ your sending domain, mailbox server and required outbound route. Ask it to confirm that the domain is active for outbound relay.
  2. Obtain the records. Request the SPF include hostname, permitted envelope sender domain, DKIM signing domain and selector. For custom DKIM, obtain the exact DNS owner name, record type and value.
  3. Verify control. Complete the ownership check SYNAQ or your reseller supplies. If it supplies a DNS verification token, publish that exact token and request confirmation; do not invent a verification TXT record.
  4. Confirm the route. Configure your mail server with the supplied smart host and relay authentication. Send an external test message and confirm that its trusted Received headers show the expected SYNAQ outbound hop.
Use the Login entry on SYNAQ's website for the customer portal. The publicly visible login uses "Username or Email Address" and "Password", with a "Forgot Password?" option.
The illustration below is limited to that verified login screen. Domain provisioning and authentication settings must come from your account instructions.
Illustrative SYNAQ customer portal login with username and password fields.
Illustrative SYNAQ customer portal login with username and password fields.
A successful portal login confirms account access. A delivered test message through the provisioned relay confirms that the outbound path is working.
Changing MX records affects inbound delivery. It does not, by itself, route outgoing mail through SYNAQ or authorize that mail in SPF.

Set up SPF

SPF must authorize the SYNAQ server that connects to the recipient, using the domain in SMTP MAIL FROM, which normally appears in the delivered Return-Path. Configure that domain to match your visible From domain, or share its organizational domain when relaxed SPF alignment applies.
Get the correct include hostname from SYNAQ for your provisioned service. Do not infer it from an MX record or the portal address. The record below is a conditional example, not a universal SYNAQ instruction.
  1. Read existing DNS. Find the TXT record beginning v=spf1 at the envelope sender domain. At the zone root, your DNS editor usually uses @ or a blank host field.
  2. Merge authorization. Insert the SYNAQ-supplied include before the final all mechanism. Preserve other authorized senders and publish only one SPF record at that name.
  3. Check the envelope. Have SYNAQ preserve or configure an authorized Return-Path under your domain. Changing Reply-To does not change SPF alignment.
  4. Validate lookups. Check the full include chain. SPF permits at most 10 DNS-querying terms during evaluation, including nested terms; exceeding that limit produces permerror.
Example only: use if SYNAQ confirms this include and is your only senderdns
v=spf1 include:_spf-securemail.synaq.com -all
Publish this example only after SYNAQ confirms _spf-securemail.synaq.com for your service and its TXT record resolves correctly. If SYNAQ supplies a different include, use that value. An existing multi-sender SPF record needs a merge, not replacement with this example.
Run the SPF check against the actual envelope sender domain. If mail uses bounce.example.com, checking example.com alone does not establish whether that message passes SPF.

SPF checker

Find SPF syntax issues, lookup limits, and weak records.

?/16tests passed
After saving DNS, repeat the lookup after the previous TTL expires and send another external message. Confirm both SPF pass and a matching authenticated domain in the receiver's results.
If a particular sending route uses a provider-owned Return-Path, adding SPF at your From domain does not fix that mismatch. A passing DKIM signature with domain alignment is sufficient for DMARC, but confirm that signature survives the complete SYNAQ route.

Set up DKIM

DKIM signing must happen on the sending system. Publishing a public key alone does not enable signing. I check a delivered message first, because the signature identifies the actual signing domain and selector.
  1. Inspect the signature. Read d= and s= in DKIM-Signature. Ask SYNAQ to confirm its signing behavior for your service if no signature is present.
  2. Check domain alignment. Compare d= with the visible From domain. A service signature using d=synaq.com does not supply DKIM alignment for example.com, even when its cryptographic check passes.
  3. Publish supplied keys. If SYNAQ provisions signing with your domain, publish its exact TXT or CNAME record at the supplied selector name. Keep the private key on the signer; never place it in public DNS.
  4. Preserve mailbox signing. If signing happens on your mailbox server, test the message after SYNAQ processing. Have SYNAQ confirm a route that preserves the signature or supported signing after content changes.
The DNS lookup name is the selector, followed by ._domainkey., followed by the signing domain. These commands illustrate how to query the values read from a message; securemail and selector1 are examples, not selectors to publish blindly.
Illustrative DKIM key lookupsbash
dig +short TXT securemail._domainkey.synaq.com dig +short CNAME selector1._domainkey.example.com dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.example.com
A shared SYNAQ key does not become a supported custom-domain setup simply because you copy it or point a new CNAME at it.
The signer must use your domain, and SYNAQ must support that configuration. Confirm the signing domain on a new delivered message after any change.
Provider-domain signature
A signature with d=synaq.com authenticates synaq.com. With From: sender@example.com, that signature alone does not satisfy DMARC.
Maintain passing SPF with domain alignment if this is the only DKIM signature available.
Your-domain signature
A passing signature with d=example.com matches From: sender@example.com. Under relaxed alignment, a signing subdomain can also match.
Verify the signature after all branding and filtering steps. A changed signed body can invalidate DKIM.
For routes without custom-domain DKIM, keep SPF alignment working and record that dependency before enforcing DMARC. Do not interpret a green DKIM pass for another domain as proof that forwarding will preserve DMARC.

Set up DMARC

Publish DMARC in the DNS zone for the domain in the visible From address. It is a domain policy, so use one record that covers all legitimate sending sources, including SYNAQ.
  1. Preserve enforcement. If the domain already uses p=quarantine or p=reject, keep that policy. Fix SYNAQ authentication without resetting the domain to p=none.
  2. Create reporting. For a new deployment, create one TXT record at _dmarc.example.com. Use the monitoring record below and replace the example reporting address with a working destination you control.
  3. Check the destination. Confirm that the reporting mailbox accepts aggregate report attachments. An external reporting service also needs the external-destination DNS authorization required by DMARC.
  4. Validate publication. Remove duplicate DMARC records at the same name, confirm the live policy and send a fresh test message after DNS caches refresh.
New deployment: TXT value at _dmarc.example.comdns
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
Create the record with the DMARC record generator. The address dmarc@example.com is a placeholder. Replace it before publishing; the policy belongs at your domain's _dmarc name.
Enter the visible From domain in the checker below. The check establishes whether the DNS policy is valid. Message testing is still required to establish whether SYNAQ mail passes DMARC.

DMARC checker

Look up a domain's DMARC record and catch policy issues.

?/7tests passed
With p=none, receivers are not asked to quarantine or reject mail because it fails DMARC. Receivers still apply their own filtering and acceptance rules.
Keep relaxed alignment unless your domain policy requires strict matching. A Return-Path at bounce.example.com matches example.com under relaxed SPF alignment; strict SPF alignment requires an exact domain match.

Verify and troubleshoot

Test the full production route, including any SYNAQ branding, rather than a message that bypasses it. I inspect authentication results added by the receiving system, not results inserted by the sender.
  1. Send a fresh test. Use a real mailbox or application that normally sends through SYNAQ. Repeat for each distinct outbound route and sending domain.
  2. Read receiver results. Check SPF status and smtp.mailfrom, DKIM status and header.d, then DMARC status and header.from. At least one passing method must have domain alignment.
  3. Check DNS errors. Resolve duplicate SPF records, missing includes and lookup-limit errors. For DKIM, use the actual d= and s= values, and check for duplicated domain suffixes in the DNS owner name.
  4. Check content changes. If DKIM fails after SYNAQ adds a banner or disclaimer, review signing order with SYNAQ. ARC is not a replacement for a passing signature with domain alignment.
Illustrative receiver results: DMARC passes through SPFtext
Authentication-Results: receiver.example; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.com; dkim=pass header.d=synaq.com; dmarc=pass header.from=example.com
In this example, SPF supplies the required domain match. The DKIM pass authenticates synaq.com, so it does not supply DKIM alignment for example.com.
Use the email tester below for a quicker configuration check. It provides a destination address: send a new message through your normal SYNAQ route to that address, then review the authentication diagnosis.

Email tester

Send a real email to this address. Suped shows a results button when the test is ready.

?/43tests passed
Fix the reported issue, then send a new message to retest. DNS changes do not change the authentication results on messages already delivered.
Use the compact checks below to distinguish a valid DNS record from successful authentication on a real message.

Result

Meaning

Next action

SPF pass
IP authorized
Check domain match
DKIM pass
Signature valid
Check signing domain
DMARC fail
No qualifying pass
Fix authentication
DKIM body failure
Signed content changed
Review signing order
SPF permerror
Evaluation error
Fix SPF record
Check both authentication and domain alignment on delivered mail.
An SPF permerror is different from an alignment mismatch. Fix record evaluation first, then compare the authenticated envelope sender domain with the visible From domain.
A DKIM body hash failure needs a signing-route investigation. A missing selector needs a DNS investigation. Use the actual failure result to choose the correction.
One passing method is enough for DMARC
An SPF alignment error does not make DMARC fail when DKIM passes with domain alignment. The reverse is also true. Prefer both methods working where the sending route supports them.

Get alerted when it breaks

A successful test covers one message. DNS edits and outbound routing changes can break authentication later. Suped is our DMARC reporting platform, with source diagnostics and notifications for investigating those changes.
  1. Enable notifications. In Suped, configure Issues detected and Sending sources need verification notifications. Enable DMARC summary emails for ongoing review.
  2. Review the source. Use incoming aggregate reports to inspect SYNAQ traffic by source IP and reporter. Check the failing authentication method and authenticated domain before editing DNS.
  3. Investigate changes. Compare DNS history with the first failures. Follow the detected issue's steps to fix, then verify with new DNS checks and a newly delivered test message.
  4. Assign ownership. Route the investigation to the person responsible for DNS or SYNAQ relay configuration. Review newly observed sources before treating them as authorized.
Suped's DMARC monitoring connects aggregate report failures with authentication diagnostics and fix steps. That gives the team evidence to investigate instead of relying on a periodic manual DNS check.
Report-based alerts depend on report arrival
DMARC aggregate reports are not an instant feed of individual messages. Alert timing depends on when receivers send reports and when they are processed. Use a fresh email test when validating an immediate change.

Secure your domain with p=reject

Move to p=reject after legitimate sending routes consistently pass DMARC and unresolved failures have an explanation. I base enforcement on the source inventory and representative traffic, including infrequent application mail.
  1. Inventory legitimate mail. Review SYNAQ alongside every application sending with the domain. In Suped, verify recognized sources and investigate unknown sources before changing policy.
  2. Resolve real failures. Use Suped's record detail and issue diagnostics to repair legitimate traffic. For SYNAQ, confirm the actual envelope sender and whether a passing custom-domain DKIM signature survives processing.
  3. Stage the policy. After representative monitoring, move a new deployment to p=quarantine and check delivery plus incoming reports. Proceed to p=reject when legitimate failures are resolved; no fixed waiting period proves readiness.
  4. Keep reporting active. Use Suped's Hosted DMARC policy controls if the domain is already configured for hosted management, or edit its existing DNS policy. Continue notifications and review inherited subdomain policy before enforcement.
Suped keeps the source review, failure diagnostics and policy management in one workflow. Use those reports to assess the effect of each policy change rather than treating one passing test as permission to enforce across the domain.
Final policy example: replace the reporting addressdns
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
Update the existing DMARC policy rather than publishing a second record. With hosted management, change the hosted policy instead of adding a competing TXT record at the CNAME owner name.
A domain-level pass rate does not prove that every legitimate route works. Check low-volume sources separately before rejecting failures.
Check the SPF-only dependency
If SYNAQ mail passes DMARC only through SPF, forwarding can remove that passing path. Resolve supported custom-domain DKIM and content modification issues before assuming the same mail will pass after forwarding. A p=reject policy requests rejection of DMARC failures; receivers retain discretion over handling.
Record the policy change time and the previous DNS TTL. Compare reports for traffic after the change, allowing for cached DNS and delayed aggregate reports.
When rotating a DKIM key, publish the new selector before switching the signer. Keep the old public key available while messages signed with it are still in transit.

Frequency asked questions

A verified sending-IP PTR hostname ending in synaq.com indicates SYNAQ infrastructure. Confirm that the hostname resolves back to that IP, then compare the receiver's trusted headers and your SYNAQ configuration. A matching hostname suffix identifies infrastructure; it does not prove that the message is authorized for your From domain.

Use the include hostname SYNAQ supplies for your provisioned outbound service. The _spf-securemail.synaq.com record shown above is conditional on that confirmation. Verify the include's SPF TXT record, merge it into your existing record and keep only one SPF record per DNS name.

No. For From: sender@example.com, d=synaq.com does not provide DKIM alignment. DMARC still passes if SPF passes with domain alignment, or another passing DKIM signature matches your From domain under the configured alignment mode.

Yes, for DMARC, if the passing DKIM signature has domain alignment with the visible From address. A DKIM pass for a provider-owned domain is insufficient. Keep SPF configured correctly wherever your sending route supports your own Return-Path.

Keep an existing p=reject or p=quarantine policy. Configure and test the SYNAQ route before sending production traffic. Use p=none for a new monitoring deployment, then strengthen policy after checking legitimate sources.

A banner or disclaimer can change content covered by the original DKIM signature. Ask SYNAQ to confirm a supported signing order or a route that preserves the signature. Test the final delivered message; publishing a different public key does not repair a changed signed body.
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What you'll get with Suped
Real-time DMARC report monitoring and analysis
Automated alerts for authentication failures
Clear recommendations to improve email deliverability
Protection against phishing and domain spoofing