How to set up DMARC/DKIM/SPF for ServiceNow

Updated on 7 Nov 2026: We clarified ServiceNow's Return-Path and DKIM checks, added a header example, and corrected DMARC test-mode rollout guidance.
ServiceNow can send workflow notifications, ticket updates, incident mail, approvals, and case messages using a customer From domain. An SPF or DKIM pass with identifier alignment gives DMARC a pass; delivery also depends on the receiver's filtering. Confirm the sending path, publish the correct DNS records, and review DMARC reports before choosing an enforcement policy.
- Follow the order in ServiceNow's public DKIM and SPF post: obtain the DKIM selector and public key, publish DKIM and SPF, then reprovision email.
- Merge ServiceNow into the existing SPF record instead of publishing a second SPF TXT record at the same domain.
- Require a valid ServiceNow DKIM signature for the customer From domain before using quarantine or reject.
- Start with p=none unless the domain already has a quarantine or reject policy.
Confirm the outbound route and From domain
First identify whether ServiceNow sends through ServiceNow Cloud Email Services or an SMTP account that your team controls. That choice determines which system provides the SPF and DKIM records and which system signs the final message. Have access to the authoritative DNS zone and an authorized Now Support account before requesting custom-domain DKIM.

ServiceNow Email Accounts page showing the outbound SMTP path and custom From domain.
- Check outbound email settings and Email Accounts to confirm whether messages leave through ServiceNow-provided SMTP or your own SMTP server.
- Set notification From and Reply-To values to addresses under a domain you control, such as support@example.com. Reply-To controls replies and is not checked by DMARC.
- For ServiceNow Cloud Email Services, use the DKIM request article and the Now Support Service Catalog to request the selector and public key for the exact From domain.
- Test with a non-production instance and a safe subdomain, then repeat the verified DNS pattern for production.
- After SPF and DKIM resolve publicly, complete the ServiceNow email reprovisioning request so DKIM signing starts on outbound notifications.
Match DNS to the outbound route
For ServiceNow-provided SMTP, the current ServiceNow SPF KB instructs customers sending with their own From domain to authorize include:service-now.com. A custom SMTP route must use the SPF and DKIM configuration for that route instead.
- ServiceNow-provided SMTP uses ServiceNow's published SPF authorization and a ServiceNow-provisioned DKIM key for the custom From domain.
- Customer-managed SMTP uses that mail route's SPF authorization and DKIM signer because ServiceNow only hands the message to the configured server.
Use a dedicated ServiceNow sending subdomain
A dedicated From subdomain such as notifications.example.com separates ServiceNow authentication from employee and corporate mail. It can have its own SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records, which limits the effect of DNS mistakes and makes an enforcement decision easier to evaluate.
Root domain
- Senders using the same envelope domain share one SPF record. Messages using the same visible From domain share a DMARC policy.
- A policy change requires evidence for employee mail, forwarded mail, mailing lists, and ServiceNow notifications.
Dedicated subdomain
- ServiceNow authentication changes stay within the notification subdomain and its DNS records.
- A notification-only subdomain has fewer indirect mail flows, which makes quarantine or reject easier to assess.
Plan replies before changing From
If users reply to ServiceNow notifications, route the published From address back to the instance or set a tested Reply-To address. Authentication does not configure inbound reply handling.
Set up SPF
SPF checks whether a sending IP is authorized for the envelope sender domain, which appears in Return-Path after delivery. ServiceNow's guidance for custom From domains uses include:service-now.com. Confirm the actual envelope domain before editing SPF, because changing From alone does not change Return-Path. DKIM remains important because SPF commonly breaks after forwarding.
|
|
|
|---|---|---|
Customer-controlled Return-Path using ServiceNow SMTP | Add include:service-now.com at that envelope domain | SPF pass for an authorized sending IP |
Customer-managed SMTP | Authorize that SMTP route | SPF pass for an authorized path |
ServiceNow-owned Return-Path | Verify DKIM for your From domain | DMARC can pass through DKIM |
Use the SPF action that matches the ServiceNow outbound route.
Example SPF mergeDNS
v=spf1 include:_spf.example.net include:service-now.com ~all
include:_spf.example.net is a placeholder for an existing sender. Replace it with your real include, or omit it if ServiceNow is the only sender. Preserve other valid mechanisms when merging.
- Confirm that the instance uses ServiceNow-provided SMTP before adding include:service-now.com.
- Keep one SPF TXT record at each envelope domain you control and place the ServiceNow include before the final ~all or -all.
- Count all evaluated DNS lookup terms, including nested includes, against SPF's limit of 10. Recheck ServiceNow's current record instead of assuming its lookup cost is fixed.
- Preserve the domain's existing final policy while merging the record. Changing ~all to -all is a separate policy decision.
SPF checker
Find SPF syntax issues, lookup limits, and weak records.
?/16tests passed
An SPF pass satisfies DMARC only when the authenticated envelope domain has identifier alignment with the visible From domain. If ServiceNow passes DKIM with a matching signing domain, DMARC can pass even when SPF lacks identifier alignment.
Set up DKIM
DKIM gives ServiceNow notifications a durable DMARC pass path because the signature usually survives forwarding. For ServiceNow-provided SMTP, ServiceNow provides a selector and public key for the custom From domain. Your DNS administrator publishes that key at the selector host under _domainkey.

ServiceNow support request for a custom-domain DKIM selector and public key.
DKIM TXT example with a placeholder selector and keyDNS
selector1._domainkey.example.com. TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public-key>"
- Request the DKIM selector and public key for the exact From domain used by ServiceNow notifications.
- Create the TXT record at selector1._domainkey.example.com for example.com, or selector1._domainkey.notifications.example.com for notifications.example.com. Replace selector1 with ServiceNow's supplied selector and avoid duplicating the DNS zone suffix.
- Paste the public key exactly as ServiceNow provides it. DNS interfaces can split a long TXT value into quoted strings, but must not add spaces inside the key.
- Check the authoritative DNS zone and allow cached records to expire according to their TTL. Then complete ServiceNow email reprovisioning and confirm a DKIM-Signature header in the message received by the recipient.
ServiceNow-provided SMTP
- ServiceNow supplies the DKIM selector and public key for the requested custom domain.
- ServiceNow begins signing outbound notifications after the DNS check and email reprovisioning.
- Verify a real incident or approval notification by inspecting the message headers at the recipient.
Customer-managed SMTP
- The configured SMTP route supplies the SPF authorization and DKIM records.
- That SMTP route signs the message after ServiceNow hands it off.
- Verify the ServiceNow Email Account, DNS records, and final recipient headers together.
Set up DMARC
DMARC checks the visible From domain against the authenticated SPF and DKIM domains. A message passes when SPF or DKIM passes and has identifier alignment with that From domain. Start with p=none unless the domain already uses quarantine or reject. Keep an existing enforcement policy and fix ServiceNow until its mail passes.
Starting DMARC recordDNS
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
Use the DMARC record generator to create the starting record with the real aggregate reporting address.
- Create one TXT record at _dmarc.example.com for example.com, or _dmarc.notifications.example.com for notifications.example.com.
- Replace dmarc@example.com with the mailbox or reporting address that collects aggregate reports.
- If the ServiceNow subdomain has no DMARC record, check the inherited organizational-domain policy, including sp when present.
- If the domain already uses p=quarantine or p=reject, do not lower it for ServiceNow.
If the reporting address is on an external domain, confirm the report destination's DNS authorization with the reporting provider before expecting aggregate reports.
DMARC checker
Look up a domain's DMARC record and catch policy issues.
?/7tests passed
Separate ServiceNow's policy from yours
The ServiceNow DMARC KB describes ServiceNow's policy for messages using @service-now.com. It does not set the DMARC policy for your custom From domain.
- Your DNS controls the DMARC policy for your domain and its covered subdomains.
- ServiceNow controls DKIM signing when its provided SMTP infrastructure sends the message.
- Aggregate reports show whether ServiceNow traffic passes at participating receivers.
- Authentication-Results headers show the result for one delivered ServiceNow notification.
Check domain alignment in received headers
DMARC uses relaxed identifier alignment by default: the authenticated domain and visible From domain share an organizational domain. Setting aspf=s or adkim=s requires an exact domain match for SPF or DKIM respectively. p=reject changes handling, not the matching mode. These rules are defined in RFC 9989.
Illustrative received headerstext
From: Service desk <support@notifications.example.com> Return-Path: <bounce@service-now.com> Authentication-Results: mx.example.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=service-now.com; dkim=pass header.d=notifications.example.com; dmarc=pass header.from=notifications.example.com
Here SPF passes for service-now.com without matching the customer From domain. DKIM passes for notifications.example.com, so DMARC passes through DKIM. These domains are examples; use the values from a real notification.
Verify and troubleshoot
Verification needs both DNS checks and a real ServiceNow notification. DNS can be correct while the instance still uses an old mail route, so test the notification path that users actually receive. Use the ServiceNow email log to confirm submission, then inspect the original message headers at the recipient. A sent state does not prove recipient delivery or a DMARC pass.

ServiceNow email log showing an incident notification marked sent.
|
|
|
|---|---|---|
SPF pass | Envelope sender authorized | Compare smtp.mailfrom with From |
SPF fail | Envelope domain does not authorize this route | Check the envelope domain's SPF and actual sending IP |
DKIM pass | Signature verified | Compare header.d with From |
DKIM fail | Signature could not be verified | Check selector, public key, and downstream message changes |
DKIM none | Expected signature is absent | Confirm the outbound route and signing activation |
DMARC fail | Neither mechanism provides a passing identifier with From-domain alignment | Fix SPF or DKIM alignment |
Use final headers to separate DNS, signing, and identifier alignment problems.
- Trigger an incident, approval, or case update from ServiceNow instead of testing with an unrelated manual sender.
- Read Authentication-Results at the recipient and compare SPF's envelope domain, DKIM's signing domain, and DMARC's From domain.
- Confirm that the sending domain has only one SPF record. Multiple SPF records produce a permanent error.
- Compare the selector in DKIM-Signature with the exact DNS host. A selector typo breaks verification even when the public key is correct.
- For ServiceNow-provided SMTP, if a received notification lacks the expected customer-domain DKIM signature after DNS publication, ask ServiceNow to check reprovisioning and the actual From domain.
Email tester
Send a real email to this address. Suped shows a results button when the test is ready.
?/43tests passed
Send a ServiceNow notification to the generated test address, then review the SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNS, and content diagnostics for that exact message.
Common ServiceNow authentication failures
- A second SPF record creates a permanent SPF error, so merge all mechanisms into one record.
- For ServiceNow-provided SMTP, missing DKIM can mean incomplete reprovisioning or a From domain that was not provisioned.
- A notification template or script can use a different From domain than the domain provisioned for DKIM.
- A strict policy before report review can affect ServiceNow and other legitimate senders using the same domain.
Get alerted when authentication breaks
ServiceNow email authentication can break after an instance change, DNS edit, sender address change, or mail route change. Suped's DMARC monitoring product groups aggregate reports by source and alerts the team when ServiceNow authentication failures exceed a configured threshold after reports arrive.
Manual report review
- Schedule regular report reviews so failures are investigated before users report missing notifications.
- Raw aggregate XML must be grouped by source IP and authentication result.
- ServiceNow failures can be mixed with unrelated sending sources.
Suped workflow
- Threshold alerts flag a material ServiceNow authentication change after reports arrive.
- Source grouping separates ServiceNow traffic from the domain's other approved senders.
- SPF and DKIM diagnostics point the owner toward the DNS or provisioning check that failed.
Choose quarantine or reject safely
The current DMARC specification, RFC 9989, makes the old pct tag historic and adds t=y for policy testing. A dedicated ServiceNow notification subdomain can move to p=reject after both SPF and DKIM are configured and report data shows consistent DMARC passes. General-purpose domains with users who post to mailing lists should avoid reject because indirect mail flows can break authentication.
DMARC policy stages
Policy stages for receivers following RFC 9989. Check receiver behavior before relying on test mode.
Monitor
p=none
Collect reports without requesting different handling.
Test quarantine
p=quarantine; t=y
Requests none for failing mail at receivers that implement t=y.
Quarantine
p=quarantine
Request quarantine for failing mail after report review.
Reject
p=reject
Use for a controlled notification domain after checking indirect flows.
Test mode depends on receiver support
Receivers that implement RFC 9989 apply none for p=quarantine; t=y and quarantine for p=reject; t=y. Receivers using the older DMARC standard ignore t=y and apply the published p policy. Keep p=none while testing an unverified route.
- Collect a representative business cycle of aggregate reports. RFC 9989 recommends at least one month at p=none and another month at quarantine before a domain with mailing-list users considers reject.
- Configure SPF and DKIM, and verify that at least one passes with identifier alignment on each legitimate message. Keep a working customer-domain DKIM signature before reject.
- Identify legitimate senders and fix their authentication before enforcement. Treat unrecognized sources as unverified until ownership is confirmed.
- Use t=y only after confirming receiver support. Remove it when the domain is ready for full policy application.
- Reserve p=reject for a domain whose legitimate indirect mail flows have been assessed, with a dedicated ServiceNow notification subdomain as the safer scope.
Optional quarantine test for receivers supporting t=yDNS
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; t=y; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
Reject stage for a controlled domainDNS
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
Suped's Hosted DMARC keeps policy changes in one managed workflow after the hosted record is configured. Teams can review ServiceNow source results before changing the final policy without editing DNS for each step.
FAQ
Yes. An aligned DKIM pass can satisfy DMARC, but SPF still authenticates the envelope sender and helps receivers assess the sending route. Configure SPF for envelope domains you control and enable DKIM before quarantine or reject.
Compare source IP ownership and authenticated domains with a real notification header. Customer-managed SMTP appears under that route's sending source. A reverse DNS name or source label alone does not prove traffic is authorized.
For ServiceNow-provided SMTP sending with your custom From domain, current ServiceNow guidance uses include:service-now.com. If the instance uses customer-managed SMTP, authorize that outbound route instead.
Yes for a controlled notification domain after SPF and DKIM are configured, customer-domain DKIM passes, and aggregate reports show no legitimate failures. RFC 9989 advises general-purpose domains with mailing-list users to avoid p=reject because indirect mail can fail DMARC.
SPF can pass for a ServiceNow-owned Return-Path while the visible From uses your domain. That SPF result lacks identifier alignment. DMARC passes only if DKIM also verifies with a signing domain that matches the From domain under the applicable DMARC mode.
Verify DNS first, then send a real ServiceNow notification to a mailbox or the email tester and inspect Authentication-Results. Confirm DMARC pass and compare the SPF and DKIM domains with the domain visible in From.

